Culture: Significantly, after their battle, the Nephites “all returned to their lands, and to their houses, and their wives, and their children.” They did not return to “the fort,” or “their base.” They went home. Even at this stage, Nephite society has no standing army. This absence of a professional military continued to be the practice in Mesoamerica as late as the Spanish conquest. Even the feared Aztec war machine was composed primarily of commoners who were called up as needed.
The social implications of this lack of a standing army are important. First, and most obvious, is that the Nephites’ ability to respond to military threats required having enough time to mobilize before an invading army arrived. Hence, the Book of Mormon frequently mentions scouts or lookouts.
Second, the lack of a standing army highlights limitations on Nephite political leaders to compel compliance from the people. The Book of Mormon never mentions a police force, and the “voice of the people” operates as the means of enforcing decisions, not force of arms. (See “Excursus: The Voice of the People,” following Mosiah 29.) Dissenters are allowed to dissent or allowed to physically remove themselves; no attempts at coercing or confining them are recorded. In many ways, the contention cycles so apparent in Nephite society are facilitated by this inability to enforce conformity. Sociologically, the lack of a standing army and cycles of dissent are two reinforcing factors. If the Nephites had had a police force or army, such extremely short cycles of political instability would be anomalous.
A third implication is that, for an agricultural society, warfare has to be a seasonal activity. John Sorenson describes this aspect of such armies:
In civilizations at such a level of technological development, armies were formed of nonprofessional militia. For example, Alma 44:23 says, “The armies of the Nephites… returned and came to their houses and their lands.” The demand for manpower to carry on agriculture provided the most stringent limit on maintaining armies. The husbandry of those times simply could not provide sufficient reliable surplus to feed many soldiers who were not themselves involved in the seasonal work. When an army did have to be kept in battle readiness, an added burden fell on the men who were still cultivating; thus the pacifist people of Ammon were obliged to exchange the products of their labor, “a large portion of their substance to support our armies,” in exchange for protection by Nephite soldiers (Alma 43:13). But unavoidably, most of those serving in the army had to meet farming’s demands during part of the year.
Another seasonal consideration was the weather. Anywhere in the tropics, rain characterizes approximately half the year—the same season when the crops are growing—with resulting muddy trails and swollen streams to cross. In all likelihood, the only time when Alma and his forces could have waded across the river Sidon, fighting as they went (see Alma 2:27), would have been in the drier part of the year. Furthermore, had armies been fighting during the rains, they would have suffered significantly while traveling, camping, or fighting, for that time can be uncomfortably cool and unhealthy. Typically the Lamanites traveled virtually naked to reach the Nephites (see Enos 1:20; Alma 3:5; 43:20, 37). They would not have done so had protecting themselves against rain and cold been a concern. On the contrary, heat-caused fatigue was mentioned as a problem in the lowlands (see Alma 51:33; cf. 62:35). So the scripture confirms logic and observations about the timing of warfare in tropical lands—the rainy season ruled out major campaigns, which took place in the dry season instead.
Of course, there could be exceptions. Regions varied in climate; certain places and times would have permitted at least limited fighting other than at the normal dry time, although we must assume that planned major campaigns had to follow the general rule.