Geography: The geography of this event is critical because we must explain how the Amlicites could have gone at least some miles farther than the Nephites yet be able to return to Zarahemla as fast as, or even faster than, the Nephites in their rear. Sorenson’s map of his proposed locale shows the Amlicites making a rough crossing over a mountainous region, then crossing the Sidon. In contrast, the alerted Nephites traveled directly over the mountains to a ford across the river. Both the Amlicites (Amalekites) and the Nephites likely took advantage of breaks, passes, or saddles in the mountain range. (See Map, “Proposed Details around Zarahemla [Upper Grijalva Valley],” p. 59.)
Culture/History: A noteworthy aspect of this episode is that the Amlicites joined with the Lamanites, a statement Mormon makes without discussion or comment. Yet it must have been a more complex action. The Amlicites were fleeing from a battle, carrying their arms and gear. They were also rushing—in retreat, it is true, but still approaching the Lamanite position rapidly in full battle equipment. Would not that fact have caused the Lamanites to spring to their own arms?
The Nephite spies did not describe (and may not have seen) this initial encounter, but it certainly must have required rapid negotiations. That requirement, in turn, implies that there was some system for communicating nonhostile intentions and, furthermore, some recognized mechanism for joining forces. The priests of Noah were able to achieve the same goal quite easily. Therefore, the Amlicites’ ethnic identity (as Nephites) was apparently no inherent impediment. Apparently they shared some type of lingua franca that facilitated rapid and clear communication, otherwise the possibility of interpreting the situation as hostile would be strong.
Sorenson proposes another scenario: that this meeting was preplanned and that the Amlicite attack on the east side of the Sidon was calculated to draw the Nephite army away from Zarahemla, leaving it vulnerable to the Lamanite attack on the west side of the Sidon. While the text offers no direct suggestion of collusion between the two groups, the description of the Amlicite/Amalekite attack makes this scenario quite plausible and also explains why the Lamanites did not challenge their fully armed appearance. This scenario, however, assumes one of two contingencies. The first would be that the Nephites were no longer pursuing them—which happened. In the second, the pursuing Nephites would have, without adequate preparation, encountered a Lamanite army that was waiting for them.
A second important aspect of this meeting was that the Lamanites were there in the “course of the land of Nephi.” This statement suggests that the Lamanites were from the land of Nephi. Apparently, this is the first time Lamanites have come from the southern lands to attack the land of Zarahemla. While there have been other skirmishes with Lamanites, none of them have described the Lamanite point of origin. This may be important for Sorenson’s suggestion of collusion between the Lamanites and Amlicites. Chiapa de Corzo (plausible Amlicite territory) had connections to the area in the Book of Mormon considered to be Lamanite lands. The Amlicites could have exploited those connections to create this plan to attack Zarahemla.